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Scholars have not infrequently called attention to the master metaphors in Durkheim’s 
writing, those figures, typically drawn from biology, physics and chemistry, which 
structure his sociological thought. Less attention has been given to the work that 
metaphors do in Durkheim’s texts, or to Durkheim’s fundamental ambivalence about 
metaphor. This paper argues that Durkheim depends on metaphor to construct the 
building blocks, and not just the overall architecture of his argument in The Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life (1912). His conception of the ‘gods’ of totemism makes the 
theory relevant to modern European religion, and in his construction of the concept of the 
sacred depends on electrical and epidemiological metaphors. I argue that Durkheim’s 
theory of social representation (the central argument of the book) is a theory of 
metaphorical relations between social organisation and the organisation of the cosmos.  
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Durkheim is arguably the least poetic of classical sociology’s holy-trinity, though this is 
much less true of his practice than it is of his aspirations. The thinker for whom la vie 
sérieuse excluded art and artifice—and to some degree he thought of these as 
synonyms—from properly sociological examinations (O’Toole 2002) does nonetheless 
have a marked, if repressed, poetic imagination. Here I argue that Durkheim’s sociology 
of religion is in fact structured by the logic of metaphor, even if his attitude toward 
metaphor itself is fundamentally ambivalent. Durkheim seems unaware of how much his 
innovative sociological thinking owes its vitality to his use of metaphor; without 
metaphor, however, his argument loses much of its analytic power, and, at least as 
important for us, much of its contemporary relevance, as well. 
  Others have written about Durkheim’s metaphors for society, particularly those 
drawn from physics, biology and chemistry (Levine 1995; Lopez 2003; Vatin 2005; 
Fernandes 2008). The argument, in each of these cases is that, at particular points in 
Durkheim’s intellectual trajectory, particular paradigm-structuring metaphors 
predominate, and this has consequences for the way he thinks about society. In this paper, 
I leave aside Durkheim’s paradigm-structuring metaphors (what Kenneth Burke (1969) 
calls ‘God metaphors’). Instead, I show how metaphors are woven into the very fabric of 
Durkheim’s late classic, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life ([1912] 1995, 2001, 
2005).  I will show that not only does Durkheim think metaphorically about religion and 
society, but that social representation is fundamentally metaphorical (even as he is 
ambivalent about his own argument at this point).  
 Metaphor is essential to the project of Les formes élémentaires in three distinct 
but partially overlapping ways. First, Durkheim’s analysis of totemism is premised on a 
metaphorical comparison between Arunta rituals and contemporary religion. This is what 
gives his argument contemporary relevance and it is therefore one of the major reasons 
why sociologists still find the book worth careful reading and rereading. Second, he 
conceptualises social representation as a metaphorical relation (even as he denies that this 
is the case). Third, Durkheim’s central concept in the book, the sacred, is developed and 
elaborated by means of metaphor; he compares it with “other kinds” of force/energy, 
particularly heat and electricity (but also, mixing metaphors, with contagious disease). 
Thus Durkheim’s research programme depends on the analytic use of metaphor (the first 
and third topics to be discussed here), and it argues that metaphor is essential to social 
representation (the second topic).  
 
THE ROLE OF METAPHOR IN INNOVATIVE THOUGHT       
 John Urry has argued that “sociology, like any other kind of thinking, cannot be 
achieved non-metaphorically” (2000: 21). Important work by scholars in a wide range of 
fields of inquiry shows that we are by no means alone in this respect. Far from simply  
decorative language, metaphors are indispensable for theory building and elaboration. 
Scholars have shown that this is the case not only in sociological thinking (Brown 1977; 
Urry 2000), but that it is no less the case in the fields of evolutionary biology (Gould 
1983), economics (McClosky 1998) and physics (Kuhn 1979; Jones 1982), for example. 
Research by cognitive psychologists (Gibbs 1994; Gibbs, Costa Lima et al. 2004) 
suggests that the use of metaphor in scientific practice is an extension of everyday speech 
and thought. We use metaphors more or less every time we speak (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980), often without realising that we are doing so, and our actions are frequently framed 
by the metaphors through which we view the world (Lakoff 1996). We think, speak and 
act metaphorically; likewise do we do science. 
 No theorist of metaphor has been more influential than Max Black showing us 
how metaphors work and why they are important for scientific discovery. His systematic 
philosophical analysis has demonstrated that metaphor does not simply replace a proper, 
literal, or descriptive word with a different, more poetic one. On the contrary, metaphors 
work by translating between two semantic domains, shaping how we understand both of 
them. One of Black’s simplest examples, “Man is a wolf”2, can be used to illustrate some 
important components of the domains of meaning in a metaphor. “Wolf” is the focus of 
the sentence, the key word that makes the sentence metaphorical. The rest of the sentence 
is called the frame; this is the context into which “wolf” is inserted, and is the principle 
subject that we want to understand by means of the metaphor. This is a (by now 
admittedly cliché) metaphor that associates “the wolf-system of related commonplaces” 
with “man”. When we use this as a metaphor for thinking about “man”, Black explains,  
[a] suitable hearer will be led by the wolf-system of implications to construct a 
corresponding system of implications about the principle subject. But these 
implications will not be those comprised in the commonplaces normally implied 
by literal uses of “man”. The new implications must be associated with the literal 
uses of the word “wolf”. Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked 
about in “wolf-language” will be rendered prominent, and any that cannot, will be 
pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, 
emphasises others—in short, organizes our view of man (1962: 41).   
This description of cognitive interactions in metaphor makes the distinction between 
concepts, models, and metaphors fuzzy at best (Hesse 1965). Further, as Black argues, 
metaphors do not simply compare things that are already alike; rather, metaphors 
construct likenesses between the two domains, organizing our understanding of the 
frame. We learn to see men in terms of wolves, exploring and extrapolating a variety of 
implications, primarily in terms of how we understand “man”, but also in terms of how 
we think of wolves; “Metaphor”, as Richard Harvey Brown puts it, “drives its points 
home on a two-way street” (1977: 81). 
 
TOTEMISM AS A METAPHOR FOR CONTEMPORARY RELIGION 
 “Religion” is every bit as problematic as a cross-cultural category today as it was 
in Durkheim’s lifetime, with no clear consensus amongst sociologists (or other scholars 
interested in the area) about how to define the object of their inquiries (Beckford 2003; 
McKinnon 2002). Durkheim shows more sensitivity to these issues do many 
contemporary sociologists of religion, and he spends 35 pages at the start of the text 
([1912] 2005: 31-66) grappling with the complexities of the problem. Noting the 
manifold problems with all of the substantive definitions (all in some way too narrow), 
Durkheim adopts a functional definition of religion, incorporating the notion of the 
‘sacred’ as a substantive element. That is, he argues religion: 
is a unified set of beliefs relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart 
and surrounded by prohibitions—beliefs and practices that unite its adherents in a 
single moral community called a church (2001:46) 
Few students of religion today are keen on Durkheim’s functional definition (O’Toole 
1984), but it is an important component not only of his theory as a whole, also but for the 
much more basic comparison he wishes to make between the elementary forms of 
Australian religion and the complex religion of modern Europe. Most of the substantive 
definitions Durkheim rejects, which focus on gods or spirits as essential to religion, 
would not have allowed such a comparison, as gods and spirits are, by Durkheim’s 
account, inessential to aboriginal life, even as they are a key component of contemporary 
Christianity and Judaism.  
 Benson Saler (1993) and Talal Asad (1993), among others, have argued that 
western scholars have only understood certain kinds of beliefs and practices in other 
times and places as “religion” by extrapolating from our western concept. Our 
understanding is marked by the prototypical cases of Christianity, Judaism and 
sometimes Islam; it developed over the past half millennium, from a more practice-
oriented concept, closer to the contemporary understanding of “piety” into a concept that 
could denote a set of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things (W.C. Smith 1978). It 
is certainly true that the early modern European explorers to encounter the inhabitants of 
faraway lands initially reported that the inhabitants of these lands had no ‘religion’. Only 
slowly did they begin to recognise similarities between the rituals and beliefs of others 
and the pieties of home (J. Z. Smith 1998). 
 A consideration of Durkheim’s Les formes élémentaires ([1912] 2005) would 
suggest that to conceive of western scholars understandings of “religion” elsewhere as 
mere projections of ethnocentric notions would be to take a somewhat lopsided view. 
While Durkheim studies the totemism of Australian Aborigines, he uses this examination 
as a means of understanding his own culture and its “religion”. By his own account 
Durkheim is primarily interested in understanding “religion in general” rather than the 
Aborigines per se; in practice, however, he is really almost exclusively concerned with 
western religion, especially Christianity and Judaism—and these in a modern European 
context. The Aborigines provide the means for him to understand his own, turn of the 
century, European social context. Put differently, his understanding of his own social 
world is mediated through the attempt to understand Aboriginal society. Aboriginal 
society provides the frame through which social relations much closer to home. The 
means by which France and the Australian outback are compared is the metaphorical 
“two way street” described by, which Richard Harvey Brown (1977: 81). This road is 
built on the bedrock of another twofold comparison, to wit:  1) the totem is god; 2) the 
god is society.  
 What Durkheim understands of aboriginal life and religion is, of course, indirect. 
He drew on ethnographic reports written by a rather motley crew of western observers, 
including those of the English biologist W. Baldwin Spencer and his collaborator Francis 
James Gillen, postmaster of Alice Springs and colonial administrator of Central 
Australia, as well as reports from the German Lutheran missionary Carl Strehlow 
(Morphy 1998; Fournier 2006: 157). These writers had already created a certain 
rapprochement between the “religion” of the Aborigines and that of the Europeans, and 
Durkheim’s conceptual apparatus served to bring them into even closer proximity. This is 
by no means to say, however, that Durkheim and his colleagues only learned from what 
they read of the Aborigines. Other significant influences undoubtedly include Sylvain 
Levi’s researches into the history of religions of India (Strenski 2006)—to be discussed 
further below with reference to religious ‘energy’—and also possibly Spinoza’s 
pantheistic philosophy (Nielson 1998), which may have made it easier to conceive of 
religion without reference to the gods.  
 Durkheim clearly meant for his book to be an analysis that had something to say 
of contemporary relevance to his immediate audience, and while he explicitly frames the 
aptness of his case in evolutionary terms, implicitly his comparison is much more direct. 
Durkheim’s direct comparison between “us” (modern Europeans) and “them” (Australian 
Aborigines) is one of the important reasons the book has withstood the test of time. Few 
scholars today find that they can accept the empirical claims about Aborigines made in 
the book, nor would very many want to swallow his evolutionary claims whole. Even for 
those inclined to thinking in strongly evolutionary terms, the suggestion that the 
aborigines are a primitive precursor to our own society is highly problematic. 
 It is the metaphorical structure of Les formes élémentaires establishes the basic 
framework for what remains of Durkheim’s classic contribution. That is to say, the book 
is not, and probably never has been, a state of the art discussion of aboriginal totemism, 
an idea that had begun to pass from the anthropological literature even as Durkheim 
wrote his treatise.  As an empirical study of the “religious” life of the Aborigines, very 
little that Durkheim wrote is worth much today (Jones 1986). On the other hand, as an 
analysis of religion in “our” (contemporary western) societies, Durkheim’s analysis is 
still one of the greatest contributions to the sociological study of religion. Although it is 
nearly a hundred years old, it continues to challenge readers and to provide new insights 
into the study of religion; for this reason, it is rightly seen as a ‘classic’ in the sociology 
of religion (O'Toole 2001).  
 Durkheim’s explicit argument for why we should examine the “religion” of the 
Aborigines in order to understand contemporary religion is undoubtedly evolutionary. 
Thus, he argues, with more than a hint of tautology, “All are equally religions, just as all 
living beings are equally alive from the humblest unicellular organism to man” 
(Durkheim 2001:5). If we can accept that all religions are instances of the same thing, 
then why privilege the study of the “humblest unicellular organism” for the study of life? 
 Durkheim’s arguments here are fairly standard socio-evolutionary fare, with 
occasional references to Cartesian principles thrown in for good measure. Totemic 
religion, like the unicellular organism is the subject under the microscope in its purest 
form. By understanding that purest, simplest, earliest form—its “elementary form”, it 
casts new light on the more recent advanced forms of the same phenomena. The 
complexity of later religion, Durkheim argues, makes it more difficult to distinguish 
primary and secondary elements. Further, the division of labour in religious practice 
makes it difficult to see the religion as a whole but for the parts: priests, prophets, laity, 
etc.  Durkheim argues that “we can only achieve an understanding of the most recent 
religions by following the way that they develop historically” (Durkheim 2001:5).  
 The Elementary Forms does not follow the historical development of religion, 
however. Rather, the elementary and the complex sit side by side, compared with one 
another explicitly and implicitly at every turn. His introductory remarks aside, Durkheim 
does not show too much interest in “religion in general” [Introduction, I], either, except 
for the purposes of definition. Rather, he confesses, “like all positive science, [his] goal is 
first and foremost to explain a current reality, something close to us and consequently 
capable of affecting our beliefs and actions. The reality is man, more specifically, man 
today” (Durkheim 2001:1). Indeed, Durkheim does not seem particularly distracted by 
the evolution of particular religions, “religion in general”, or even in comparisons 
between religions in different social contexts. The primary exception, of course, is North 
American First Nations, who provide some clues for better comprehending the 
Aborigines.  For Durkheim, totemism is important because it helps us to understand 
contemporary French religion, even as it is also clear from his analysis that some 
understanding of the “advanced” or “complex” facilitates his comprehension of the 
“primitive” as well. Nonetheless, the two contexts largely sit side by side, regularly 
compared, both implicitly and explicitly, with little attention given to anything between 
the two, or the means by which the primitive became advanced. 
 Durkheim uses numerous metaphors to describe Australian totemism, and all of 
these serve to bring into association the world of the Aboriginals and our world—they are 
the basic means by which the two societies are compared. He says that the totem is “not 
simply a name; it is an emblem, a true coat of arms, and its resemblance to the heraldic 
coat of arms has often been commented upon” ([Book 2, 1, II] Durkheim 1995:111). In 
making this comparison, we understand perfectly well the relationship between the 
symbol and the group, through an example that is part of “our” history.  Elsewhere, 
Durkheim says that the totem is the clan’s flag [Book 2, 7, III]. Given the upsurge in 
nationalism in the years leading up to World War I, this better indicates the emotional 
intensity with which a totemic symbol can be invested, and the absolute seriousness with 
which totems are regarded.  These metaphors seem to have played a role in Durkheim’s 
conception of the religious world of the Aborigines; they are certainly decisive for 
communicating this conception to his readers, as anyone who has taught The Elementary 
Forms to undergraduate students knows full well. The light-bulb usually flickers and 
comes on when we come to explain the totem in these terms. All of a sudden, “I am a 
frog” doesn’t seem quite so strange when it is compared to “I am a McKinnon” (the 
family name and crest) or “I am Canadian” (the flag).   
 If the totem can be understood as the family’s heraldic emblem and the flag of 
modern nation-states, then the vocabulary of contemporary religion is of no small 
significance in illuminating the meaning of this otherwise obscure set of beliefs and 
practices. Durkheim’s descriptions of the totemic rituals are told as if they were a Roman 
Catholic Mass; the prohibitions read like Jewish kosher laws; the effervescent gatherings 
recall the French revolution (Hunt 1988), and so forth. This may be Durkheim’s 
extrapolation from his own experience and context, but it is these implicit and ongoing 
comparisons keep the book alive. They would have caused considerable concern on the 
part of Durkheim’s earliest readers, some of whom were deeply offended at the 
suggestion that there was so much similarity between primitive, ‘pagan’ practices, and 
the services at the Notre-Dame de Paris, or the national celebrations of le quatorze juillet 
(Pickering 1984)  As we read the text, however, we understand more about how 
contemporary religion works; the description of Aboriginal religion modifies our 
understanding of contemporary religion. 
 Durkheim regularly refers to the totemic group as a “church”, consistent with his 
definition of religion developed in Book 1.1, and this metaphor insistently facilitates 
comparison of the Aboriginals beliefs and practices with the religious lives of turn of the 
century France. He could, of course, have used a different metaphor: a “temple” would 
do the trick, but this would have made implicit comparison with other (faraway) religious 
groups, and reinforced orientalist visions of the exotic ‘other’, which was not his agenda. 
He could have used any one of a number of indigenous terms instead (as he does when 
discussing other Arunta phenomena), or else, he could have used a different secular term 
drawn from a French historical context (“guild”, perhaps). The effects of such 
comparisons, however, would have been quite different, and to chose one of them would 
have meant construing the totemic group differently. “Church” is a metaphor with an 
important purpose in the argument as a whole.  To call a totemic group a “church” 
associates the world of 20th century France and the beliefs and practices of the 
aborigines; putting them into such association metaphorically makes each into a means 
for understanding the other.  
 Of course, unlike Muslims, Jews and Christians, the beliefs and practices of the 
aborigines are not really concerned with a God, gods, or even spirits. The totemic 
principal, Durkheim informs us, is not a god, but a “force” or “energy” (an idea that may 
derive from Sylvain Lévi’s researches on Brahman sacrifice (1898)), comparable to the 
ideas in different cultures of mana, wakan or orenda. But there is nonetheless, Durkheim 
claims, something “godlike” about the totemic principle, and in fact, he tells us, it is the 
precursor to the idea of the gods. The totemic principle is a “semi-divine entity” (2001: 
141). It is incarnate in every totemic species, and in particular in those “holy” things that 
are set apart by ritual prohibitions. Durkheim goes on to make the connection between 
the totemic principle and the gods of later religious traditions. Knowing that the 
aboriginals do not really have “gods”, Durkheim (shifting somewhat uncomfortably) 
acknowledges the way in which his comparison depends on metaphor.  “So”, he writes, 
the totemic god—to use the metaphor we have just adopted—is in them, just as it 
is in the totemic species and in the people of the clan. Since it is the soul of such 
different beings, we can see how it differs from those beings in whom it resides” 
(Durkheim 2001:141). 
This is not just a one-off description of the “totemic divinity” as a metaphorical construct. 
When Durkheim comes back to make the same comparison much later, in his discussion 
of the positive cult, he writes that the totemic species “is a sacred thing. It incarnates what 
I was led to call, in a metaphorical sense, the totemic divinity” (Durkheim 1995: 345). 
Totemism only has a god by virtue of its metaphorical relation to modern western theistic 
religion, by its semantic comparison with the Christians and Jews of early 20
th
 Century 
France. In this way totemism becomes Durkheim’s analytic metaphor for contemporary 
religion, the lens through which he interprets the churches and synagogues—as well as 
the national effervescence—of France. 
 CONCEPTS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL CATEGORIES OF THOUGHT AS 
METAPHORICAL RELATIONS 
 If there is a central argument to Elementary Forms, it is Durkheim’s contention 
that concepts (including the fundamental categories of perception) are anthropomorphic 
metaphors, or —more accurately— socio-morphic metaphors. Durkheim, however, is not 
entirely at ease with his own assessment of the importance of metaphor, and we find him 
providing several less than convincing objections to the radically constructionist 
conclusion of his own argument. This is something of an aporia in Durkheim’s late 
thinking on the topic, but it is an extremely fruitful contradiction that allows him to 
develop an argument that has implications fundamentally at odds with the theoretical-
methodological positions that he has defended in earlier writings. 
 In The Elementary Forms, Durkheim argues that concepts, and even those most 
fundamental concepts that the Western philosophical-scientific tradition since Aristotle 
has seen as fundamental to subsequent thought, the categories of understanding, have 
socio-religious origins. Thus, even science itself traces its ancestry back to religious 
belief and ritual. This argument is obviously of some considerable importance for 
Durkheim. He gave the argument a dress rehearsal (writing with Marcel Mauss) nine 
years earlier (1903), and then the argument is developed at length three times in the 
formes: at the beginning, roughly in the middle, and again in the book’s conclusion, 
highlighting its centrality in the overall architecture of the research program: scientific 
concepts stand in metaphorical relationship to the conceptual organization of the social 
world (Lukes 1972; Pickering 1984).  
 Durkheim introduces this analysis with the “categories of understanding”, those 
“essential notions that dominate our entire intellectual life” (2001:11); his argument can 
be presented somewhat more easily if we begin with concepts in general. Like William 
James, who famously argues that the perception of an infant before they have learned to 
conceptualise their world is nothing but a “Bloomin’ Buzzin’ Confusion” (James 1983: 
462). Durkheim likewise argues that 
perceptions are in perpetual flux; they push each other like currents in a stream, 
and while they last they are constantly transformed. Each one is a function of the 
precise moment it takes place. We are never certain of finding a perception again 
as we first experienced it; for if the thing perceived has not changed, it is we who 
are no longer the same (2001:328).  
While perceptions are individual and ephemeral, the concept is “outside of time and 
becoming”.  It is an anchor because it is social: “To think conceptually is not simply to 
isolate and group together qualities common to a certain number of objects; it is to 
subsume the variable to the permanent, the individual to the social” (334). That our 
concepts are social should be fairly self-evident, Durkheim argues, because concepts 
come from our shared language; language is a “collective elaboration” that expresses the 
way society as a whole experiences the world, or as Durkheim puts it, the way it 
“imagines the objects of experience” (330). 
 Durkheim has clearly learned some important lessons from the Kantians (Stedman 
Jones 2000). To think conceptually, he emphasises, is “not simply to see the real through 
the most general; it is to project onto sensation a light that illuminates, penetrates, and 
transforms it” (331). Our concepts allow us to make sense of our experience. It should 
already be abundantly clear that Durkheim is by no means a vulgar empiricist—he is 
highly critical of empiricism, especially in his later work (see Durkheim 2005). We do 
not, he argues, mould concepts out of the elements of our experience. While we may be 
able to vaguely sense certain similarities in the raw material of experience, Durkheim 
argues, we still need concepts to structure and form experience. Thus, he argues, 
The feeling of similarities is one thing and the notion of genus is another. Genus 
is the external framework, whose contents include objects perceived as like one 
another. The contents cannot provide their own framework. They consist of vague 
and shifting images, the superimposition and partial fusion of a fixed number of 
individual images found to have common elements.  By contrast, the framework 
is a definite form with firm boundaries that can be applied to an indefinite number 
of things, whether visible or not, whether actual or merely potential” (Durkheim 
2001:113). 
Concepts make perceived similarities possible in the first place. Genus concepts, among 
others, are too complicated to be based on the similarities of perceived experience since a 
genus may include an unlimited number of elements. Thus, similarities are not simply 
perceived— they are constructed. Put into the terms of metaphor, metaphor does not 
simply recognise already existing similarity, but rather creates similarity (for particular 
purposes). 
  But where does the capacity for generating concepts come from? We will not be 
surprised by Durkheim’s answer. If they do not come out of thin air, nor from the objects 
being conceptualised (the empiricist response), nor from an innate capacity for 
structuring perception (very roughly speaking, Kant’s answer), then they must come from 
society: 
Because men formed groups, they were able to group things; they classified 
things simply by placing them into the groups they had already formed… The 
unity of these first logical systems merely reproduces the unity of society 
(2001:112). 
The most basic form of classification is the division of the society into phratries and 
clans, the members of which are not only people, but also plants, animals, weather, 
seasons-- in fact everything in the aborigine’s world.  Everything is pre-categorised; it 
has its place in the group. Such classification and conception is not optional for a social 
group, but rather, society and its classifications are coextensive. In the conclusion to the 
Elementary Forms, Durkheim writes: 
Society is possible only if the individuals and things that compose it are 
distributed into different groups, that is, classes, and if these groups themselves 
are classified in relation to each other. Society presupposes, therefore, a self-
conscious organization that is none other than a classification. This organization is 
naturally communicated to the space it occupies (2001:339).    
Durkheim notes the metaphorical implications of his own argument, using terms that 
anticipate those that would later be developed by Max Black. The sociological advantage 
of Durkheim’s conception over that of Black, however, is that Durkheim understands 
metaphors as both reflecting and constituting social relations. It is the conceptual 
organization of the social group that is “communicated” to something else. So, for 
example, the spatial organization of the tribe is communicated to the spatial organization 
of the cosmos, and the social classes into classes of things.  
Even if he has made an important breakthrough in his sociological conception of 
metaphors, Durkheim is clearly somewhat ambivalent about thinking of the categories of 
perception as metaphorical: 
But if the categories at first translate only social states, does it not follow that they 
can be applied to the rest of nature only as metaphors? If their sole purpose is to 
express social things, they could be extended to other areas only by convention. 
Insofar as they serve us for thinking about the physical or biological world, they 
would have only the value of artificial symbols, practically useful, perhaps, but 
with no connection to reality. This would return us to nominalism and empiricism 
by another route (Durkheim 2001:20, emphasis added). 
On the one hand Durkheim clearly acknowledges that he has configured the relationship 
between the social category and the concept as applied to nature as a metaphorical 
relation—he is also quite evidently not happy about the logical implications of doing so. 
If a concept, applied to the natural world (rather than to its original use in the social 
world), is a metaphor, is it therefore nothing more than metaphor? Durkheim here shows 
that he maintains a commitment to (or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say, an 
aspiration for) realism. Even if Durkheim might not be entirely happy that the “strong 
programme” in the sociology of science has taken his argument at this point as one of its 
sources of inspiration and programmatic statements (Bloor 2000)—but they are 
nevertheless quite justified in the strand they pull from his argument.    
 Durkheim finds this idea, that scientific conceptions of the natural world are 
metaphors drawn from the social world troubling; his attempt to solve the problem is, 
however, much less than compelling.  Durkheim writes that to consider natural concepts 
as mere metaphors of their social counterparts would only be necessary if the social 
world were not part of nature, “indeed its highest embodiment” (20). In other words, 
these are not really metaphors at all, because they participate in the same semantic 
domain. In so arguing, however, Durkheim is jeopardy of undoing his whole argument—
and this in the introduction to the book, before he has had a chance to spell out the 
argument as a whole. “The social realm”, Durkheim writes,  
…is a natural realm that differs from others only in its greater complexity. Now, it 
is impossible that nature at its most basic should be radically different in other 
areas. The fundamental relations that exist between things—which these 
categories are designed to express—should be essentially similar in different 
realms. If they appear more obvious in the social world—for reasons we shall 
investigate—they must certainly be found elsewhere, if in more veiled forms (20).        
 If the social categories correspond to those in the natural world, however, what response 
can Durkheim give those who would claim that concepts emerge from nature itself? Why 
should we make the long, treacherous journey through the social world, when the 
concepts and categories that emerge from the social world already ‘correspond’ to those 
of the natural world?  An empiricist critic could at this point simply object that Durkheim 
is making a several hundred-page digression into the social origins of concepts, when the 
more direct route— from the objects of our perceptions to the concepts—ends at the same 
destination.  
 This empiricist response is certainly not an argument that Durkheim would be 
willing to accept, especially not by the time he wrote the Elementary Forms, but it is 
difficult how see how it could be countered effectively.  Durkheim’s intellectual honestly 
is not exactly above reproach at this point, either, because it is difficult to imagine that he 
believed his own assertions on this point. His explorations in comparative ethnology had 
shown him how differently different cultures imagine the world, and he regularly draws 
on these differences for making his arguments, especially in the earlier version of this 
argument (Durkheim and Mauss 1903). 
 Durkheim’s second answer, developed only at the end of his book is much more 
interesting and provocative. Here he suggests that an emerging global consciousness, 
where the mutual interactions of different societies and their conceptions of the world, 
would serve to make socially derived concepts even more ‘impersonal’ than they could 
be derived from a single society, and hence more ‘objective’. This is a highly suggestive 
argument, full of interesting implications for thinking about science in the global world 
(see Inglis and Robertson 2008). It is also less than fully satisfactory, because it does not 
solve the problem as we find it here—rather, he simply leaves it to be sorted out by future 
global scientists. A hundred years into Durkheim’s future, in our much more globalised 
world, the philosophical problem of the concepts seems no more immediately or easily 
resolvable. 
 Durkheim is not merely insisting on the unity of the sciences, he is also trying to 
dispense with what he recognises is potentially “just a metaphor” — mere metaphor often 
being seen as a threat to the scientific enterprise (at least for those with empiricist 
leanings). While Durkheim clearly recognises (with Nietzsche, Max Black, Mary Hesse 
and others),  that if the concepts and categories translate from one semantic domain to 
another (from the “social” world to the “natural”), then they are metaphors. If they are 
concepts that are wholly appropriate only in one domain (the domain of unified science), 
then they are not metaphors.  
 By insisting that the social and natural world together constitute one semantic 
domain, Durkheim tries to distance his argument from the implications that stem from 
seeing the relation between the two as metaphorical. But the unintended consequences of 
this conclusion would be to acquiesce to the empiricist claims that he thinks are 
untenable. This resistance to metaphor may derive from Comtean aspirations for a unified 
science, with sociology as the Queen of the sciences—after all it is society that is the 
“highest embodiment” of nature. More likely it stems primarily from Durkheim’s 
aesthetic ambivalence (O’Toole 2003). Until Max Black’s seminal publication, it was not 
widely recognised that metaphor was fundamental for the practice of science itself. 
Durkheim clearly wrestles with this problem, but in 1912 he is not in a position to solve 
it. 
 METAPHORS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SACRED CONCEPT 
 If metaphor plays a key role in Durkheim’s socio-morphic theory of perception, 
including in that of the sciences, metaphors drawn from the natural sciences also play a 
vital role in his thinking, even after his research programme has taken a decisive turn 
towards what we would now identify as ‘cultural sociology’ (Alexander 2005). Durkheim 
often draws on concepts and ideas from the domains of natural science, and he uses them 
to describe aspects of the social world. So natural do these metaphors, drawn from 
physics, biology and sometimes chemistry and public health seem to contemporary 
readers, that they are often missed. They seem have made themselves so much at home in 
Durkheim’s texts that they are often passed over in silence, except by critics—or 
advocates—of his more positivistic tendencies. But champions and critics of Durkheim’s 
scientism typically miss the mark by taking Durkheim at his own word when he 
advocates understanding terms like “social forces” as literal expressions, rather than as 
metaphors (Takla and Pape 1985). Durkheim clearly thought of social “forces” as like 
other (physical) “forces”, but there are tensions and differences here that cannot simply 
be ignored. A metaphor constructs and marks both the likeness and unlikeness. By 
literalising Durkheim’s metaphors (much as Durkheim himself sometimes tried to do), 
the comparison is gone: all “forces” can be studied scientifically, despite their differences 
and divergences, by the same methods. (It hardly needs to be observed that, whether 
sociology be counted among the sciences or not, the sciences are hardly unified in their 
methodology!) 
 Durkheim’s sociological examinations of the sacred are premised on two key 
metaphors, both drawn from the natural sciences, though both having more proximate 
origins in the study of religion: the sacred as energy, like electricity, and sacredness as a 
kind of contagion. It is difficult to see how Durkheim would think about the sacred, let 
alone explain it, without regular recourse to these two natural scientific metaphors. 
Durkheim is not the first, however, to use either metaphor: both appear in the works of 
the great Aberdeen theologian and anthropologist William Robertson Smith (1889; Jones 
1986). Until recently, Durkheim scholars have not given adequate due to the influence of 
Sylvain Levi (1898), the great historian of Indian religions that Marcel Mauss described 
as his ‘other uncle’ (Strenski 1998: 121; Strenski 2006). The metaphor of contagion is not 
readily apparent in the work of Sylvain Levi, but the metaphor of sacred electricity 
appears with at key moments in his texts. 
 The Ninth Century medieval philosopher-monk John Scotus Eriugena argued that 
most language about God and God’s attributes was metaphorical, and hence improper for 
talking about the divine essence. Whereas these metaphors relate our experience to the 
divine essence, God is simply above and beyond comparison with mundane experience 
(Kenny 2005: 285-88). For parallel reasons, Durkheim has something of this same 
reticence when it comes to defining the sacred.  When he introduces the concept in Book 
1 (chapter 1, section III), he in fact says almost nothing about what the sacred is. Instead, 
he takes us down John Scotus Eriugena’s via negativa to knowledge of divine things. 
Durkheim’s road is somewhat different than that of the 9th century theologian, even if the 
comparison between the two is useful. 
 In his introductory chapter, while Durkheim tells us nothing about what the sacred 
is, he does have a great deal to say about what it is not, that is: it is not profane. This 
basic division, Durkheim insists predominates in “all religions”, and is present in every 
culture—a self evident fact that in retrospect has become one of Durkheim’s more 
contentious claims. While Durkheim lists potentially sacred things, things that have 
sometimes been considered sacred, this does not help clarify what the sacred is, because 
his point is in fact that anything may be, or may become, sacred. What is “essential” for 
Durkheim is that the sacred is not the profane, a distinction which, he says, is “absolute”. 
Expounding on this claim, he writes: 
There is no other example in the history of human thought of two categories of 
things so profoundly differentiated or so radically opposed to one another. The 
traditional opposition between good and evil is nothing by comparison; good and 
evil are opposite species of the same genus, namely morality, just as sickness and 
health are merely two different aspects of the same order of facts—life. By 
contrast, the sacred and the profane have always and everywhere been conceived 
by the human mind as separate genera, as two worlds that have nothing in 
common. The energies at play in one are not merely different in their degree of 
intensity; they are different in kind (Durkheim 2001: 38, emphasis added).  
This passage both indicates the extent to which Durkheim stays on the path of a negative 
theology of the sacred, and shows the point at which it becomes impossible to tread. 
Thus, the division between sacred and profane is so significant and the distance between 
the two poles is so great that it can only be explained by negative reference to other 
opposites—good and evil, sickness and health. The division between sacred and profane 
is so much greater that there is no contact between them, such that they are different 
“planets”. Here, obviously with comparison to astronomical bodies, the will to resist 
metaphor has reached its limits, and Durkheim begins to hint at one of the metaphors that 
will become essential for positive thinking about the sacred: the sacred is a certain kind 
of energy. 
 Having adequately separated the sacred and profane (although not without having 
broken the prohibition against metaphor), this distinction becomes the essential element 
in Durkheim’s definition of the sacred: 
Sacred things are those things protected and isolated by prohibitions; profane 
things are those things to which such prohibitions apply and which must keep 
their distance from what is sacred (Durkheim 2001: 40).  
This “definition” still says nothing about what the sacred is, however, and Durkheim’s 
supplemental discussion only serves to further clarify how the sacred is different and 
opposed to the profane.  
 Durkheim does eventually discuss the sacred in positive terms in The Elementary 
Forms, though it takes him until Book II, chapters 6 and 7 before he does so at any great 
length, or with much precision, coming back again to a positive conception again at 
length in Book III, chapter 1.  Durkheim is keen to show that the totemic symbols are not 
themselves the object of the cult’s worship: “totemism is the religion not of certain 
animals, men, or images, but of a kind of anonymous and impersonal force that is found 
in each of these beings though identical with none” (2001: 140). The “totemic god” is 
defined in purely negative terms: not only impersonal and nameless, but having no 
history or transcendence, and inhabiting no particular location. In positive terms, it can 
only be understood as an “energy” which is the “true subject of the cult”.  The “[s]pirits, 
demons, genies, gods of every rank are merely the concrete forms that capture this 
energy, this ‘potentiality’ as Hewitt calls it,” (148).  
In Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, Robertson Smith uses strikingly 
similar terms. There, he writes: 
…the mysterious superhuman powers of the god—the powers which we call 
supernatural—are manifested according to primitive ideas, in and through his 
physical life, so that every place and thing which has natural associations with the 
god is regarded, if I may borrow a metaphor from electicity, as charged with 
divine energy and ready at any moment to discharge itself to the destruction of the 
man who presumes to approach it unduly (1889: 141). 
Smith’s conception of this sacred electricity, though used in much the same way 
Durkheim will later do, is perhaps too tied to the gods as the source of such power, and 
only explains the prohibition against improper handling of the dangerous power. Sylvain 
Levi, on the other hand, also conceptualised ritual energy as akin to electricity in La 
doctrine du sacrifice dans les brâhmanas (1898). In that book, Levi prioritises ritual over 
myth, arguing that in the Brâhmanas, ritual sacrifice (Prajâpati) is Lord of Creation and 
father of the Gods. Levi repeatedly compares the creative energy released by ritual 
sacrifice to electricity; for example, he argues, at the beginning of the chapter on the 
mechanisms of sacrifice: 
Sacrifice is a combination of skilful and complicated ritual acts and sacred words, 
or rather it is intangible and irresistible power that emerges from their merger, as 
the electric fluid born of the elements brought into contact (Levi 1898:77 my 
translation). 
Like Lévi, Durkheim argues that this electricity-like force is a ‘real’ power (intangible 
though it may be). Thus, he writes: 
When we say that these principles are forces, we are not using the word in a 
metaphorical way: they believe like real forces. In a sense, they are even material 
forces that mechanically generate physical effects. If an individual comes into 
contact with them without taking the necessary precautions, he receives a shock 
that can be compared to an electric charge (2001: 141-2). 
While Durkheim insists that he is not using a word from one semantic domain and 
applying it in another, in so doing he protests too much. Thus, he argues, these are forces 
that behave “like” real forces; “in a sense” they are even (real) material forces; the shock 
that one can get from handling the sacred inappropriately “can be compared to” an 
electric shock. In sum, the only way he can avoid using a metaphor is to use a simile—a 
weaker, more cautious form of metaphor—before reverting once more to metaphorical 
language.  
 The electric charge of the sacred helps Durkheim to make sense of particular 
characteristics of the sacred to which Durkheim turns in his section on religious rites. The 
power flows not so much from the “contact” of sacred words with ritual acts (as in Lévi’s 
analysis), but the same sparks fly when the sacred is allowed to come into contact with 
the profane. This contact is ritually important: on the one hand, carefully bringing the 
profane into proper contact with the sacred can “consecrate” it “just as today a body is 
put into contact with a source of heat or electricity in order to warm or electrify it” (2001: 
314). It also helps him to explain the “extensive and important system of religious 
interdictions that separates, not different sorts of sacred things, but all that is sacred from 
all that is profane” (2001: 224) exemplified “first and foremost” by the prohibition of 
contact. While we can handle profane things, if we do not take adequate precautions, 
sacred things have the capacity to give us quite a “shock”. It is the capacity for the sacred 
to “flow” from one object to another necessitates rituals keeping the sacred confined, as 
well as defining the safe means by which they can be connected. So, Durkheim explains: 
When a force or a property seems to us to be an integral part, a constituent 
element, of the thing it informs, we have trouble imagining that it can detach itself 
and transport itself elsewhere. A body is defined by its mass and its atomic 
composition; and we do not imagine that it can communicate any of its distinctive 
features through contact. But on the other hand, if we are speaking of a force that 
has entered the body from the outside, something that is not attached to it, 
something alien to it, it is not unthinkable that it might escape. So the heat or 
electricity any object has received from an external source can be transmitted to 
the surrounding setting. The mind readily accepts the possibility of this 
transmission. The extreme case with which religious forces radiate and become 
diffused is therefore not in the least surprising if they are generally conceived as 
external to the beings in which they reside. And that is indeed implicit in the 
theory we have proposed (2001: 240). 
 This is the elaboration of Durkheim’s chosen metaphor. Thinking of the sacred in terms 
of electrical energy shapes how we conceptualise its characteristics, its causes and 
consequences.  It provides a means of thinking effectively about the sacred as a force that 
flows through objects without being an inherent part of them; objects can be charged, 
drained, and they can shock those who handle charged objects without sufficient ritual 
caution. 
 In discussing the sacred, Durkheim mixes his metaphors, and his talk of sacred 
energy alternates with a different metaphor with overlapping, but by no means identitical 
implications. Following William Robertson Smith, Durkheim also theorises about sacred 
contagion (see Smith 1889:427-435). Like the energy metaphor, the bio-epidemic 
metaphor stresses that the sacred is not inherent in the sacred objects which are merely its 
symbols, but rather than is a force that incarnates them. Such is its contagiousness that 
elaborate rituals are required, and ascetic disciplines imposed, in order to keep the sacred 
in its proper realm. 
 Why is sacred electricity not a sufficient metaphor on its own?  The electrical 
metaphor depends on transfer of sacredness, or profanation, through contact. The sacred 
contagion metaphor, on the other hand allows Durkheim to think about the ways in which 
the sacred may spread not by contact, but by semantic contiguity. Things that are 
“associated” with other sacred things in the imaginations tend to catch the sacred: 
commuters who share a semantic subway car for a few stops, and arrive home with the 
same cold. They may never come into contact, but their proximity provides a means for 
them to incarnate the sacred virus. 
 If this sounds a bit trivial, in fact it is not. The construction of semantic proximity 
is for Durkheim the fundamental building block for conceptual thought, and ultimately of 
science itself. This contagion is how crows, tea-trees, springtime and smoke all come to 
share the same clan—and Durkheim argues that this is the fundamental beginning of our 
socially developed capacity for forming concepts and categories. Durkheim’s description, 
at the end of Book 3, chapter 1 is instructive not just for his conceptualisation of the 
sacred contagion, but also for the theory of metaphors insofar as it applies to his own 
work. Does genus 
not mingle and fuse disparate beings, despite their natural differences? But we 
have seen that these fusions and participations have played a logical and highly 
useful role: they have served to connect things that sensation leaves quite 
separate.  It is far from true, then, that contagion, the source of these yokings and 
comminglings, is marked by that fundamental irrationality which one is at first 
inclined to attribute to it. It opens the way to future scientific explanations 
(Durkheim 2001).  
Durkheim’s description here of the cultic origins of conceptualisation also provides a 
good account of metaphors—even his own metaphors—about which Durkheim himself 
has such a deeply ambivalent attitude. Metaphors yoke and commingle semantic domains 
in potentially fruitful ways, opening the way to scientific explanation—not least in the 
social-scientific explanation of religion: the totem has a god; the god is society; the 
sacred is a kind of energy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the same way that the worshipper is invigorated by their gods, who in turn are 
empowered by a society that the worshipper cannot see directly, Durkheim gains analytic 
power from his metaphors but he is unable to fully accept them for what they are, or 
acknowledge their role in his thinking. His conception of the totem as a figure for modern 
religion, his theory of the social production of the categories of thought, his construction 
of the sacred as a social “energy”, and the analysis of the gods as representations of 
society all belie a profoundly metaphorical imagination. Not only is metaphor important 
for the construction of Durkheim’s argument, it also provides a theory of metaphor as 
something essential to social representation—itself the fundamental building block of 
societies in Durkheim’s late conception. 
 Durkheim is ambivalent about metaphor, and this causes him some difficulties.  
Only with great reluctance does he acknowledge some of his metaphors, such as the 
“totemic god” but he is in fact the progenitor of many others—some of which he seems 
unable, or at least unwilling to recognise. His remarkable capacity to think 
metaphorically, however, seems unconstrained by his reservations about metaphor, and 
this is partly what makes him such an innovative thinker.  He not only coins new 
metaphors, but since he tends to take his own metaphors so seriously, he analyses and 
examines the implications of each one thoroughly. 
 This is perhaps Durkheim’s strength, but also his weakness. When we recognise 
that the metaphors that we use, we can maintain a healthy sense that our analytic 
language is necessarily only ever partial and provisional. Metaphors are necessary and 
helpful tools, but they can also constrain our abilities to see beyond the metaphor. 
Durkheim saw totemism as the elementary form of religion, rather than as a helpful 
metaphor for thinking about contemporary religious life. As Jones (1986) demonstrated 
so effectively, when Frazer interpreted totemism as a form of magic, Durkheim was 
forced to defend the position that totemism “really” was a religion, even the most 
primitive religion, untouched by later evolutionary influences. Acrobatic intellectual 
contortion followed from his inability to see the totem as a useful metaphor.    
 If Durkheim had no issue with the religious origins of scientific categories and 
analytic concepts, the fundamentally non-rational sources of rational thought, why should 
he seem to have such ambivalence about metaphors? While Durkheim does not address 
this issue anywhere in his writings, the answer is likely bound up in his conception of la 
vie serieuse: metaphor smacks of poetry, art, and thus also artifice, rather than of the 
science of the social. But if we recognise that metaphor is an essential element in all 
thinking, we have a better chance of seeing when our metaphors are useful, and when 
they are likely to lead us astray.  
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FOOTNOTES 
1
 I am grateful to David Inglis and Roland Robertson, the Editors of JCS, and the three 
anonymous reviewers for wise and helpful comments on this paper.  
 
2
 I have considered translating this metaphor into a more gender inclusive form, but I 
decided that not only would this result in a clumsy mouthful, but it may also make for a 
metaphor that is less apt. 
 
 
